University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

1-1-2008

Wills, Trusts and Estates (Annual Survey of Virginia
Law, 2006-2008)
J. Rodney Johnson
University of Richmond, rjohnson@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
Recommended Citation
J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts and Estates, 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 435 (2008)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson *

I. INTRODUCTION

The 2007 Session of the General Assembly enacted substantially more wills, trusts, and estates legislation than one typically
expects, some of which was of a particularly significant nature,
such as that (1) providing for the probate of wills not executed
with the required statutory formalities; (2) preventing any future
application of an unfortunate augmented estate decision of the
Supreme Court of Virginia; (3) avoiding the impact of federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
preemption in certain insurance revocation and slayer statute
cases; and (4) mandating notice to the public when modification
or termination of a charitable trust, or the sale of its realty, is
sought. In addition, there were fourteen other enactments from
the 2007 Session, and three from the 2008 Session, along with
eleven opinions from the Supreme Court of Virginia during the
two-year period ending May 1, 2008 that presented issues of interest in this area. This article reports on all of these legislative
and judicial developments.!

Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law.
In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Code of Virginia sections, they
will often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated,
those section numbers will refer to the most recent version of the section to which refer.
ence is being made.
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II. 2007 LEGISLATION

A Will Execution-Statutory Formalities-Dispensation
It is elementary law that, although a writing may have been
executed in accordance with all of the mechanical formalities imposed by the statute of wills,2 nevertheless, the writing will be
denied probate if it is the product of fraud, duress, or undue influence. And this is the way it ought to be-no one should profit
by such conduct. In this context, the layperson unencumbered by
a legal education would probably think it an appalling non sequitur to say that, even though clear and convincing evidence (1)
proves that a particular writing does represent the author's testamentary intent, (2) establishes the author's testamentary capacity, and (3) negates any fraud, duress, or undue influence, the
writing will nevertheless be denied probate-solely because it
was not executed in accordance with the statutory formalities intended to ensure these goals. Yet such has been the historic general rule in America and the historic position of the Supreme
Court of Virginia. For example, "the statute must be strictly followed" in order to protect the testator and prevent fraud.3 A
growing belief that a rigid adherence to the statutory formalities
has not only failed to accomplish this goal, 4 but, instead, has re-

2. Virginia's statute of wills (with the provisions relating to holographic wills omitted) reads as follows:
No will shall be valid unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by
some other person in his presence and by his direction, in such manner as to
make it manifest that the name is intended as a signature; and moreover ...
the signature shall be made or the will acknowledged by him in the presence
of at least two competent witnesses, present at the same time; and such witnesses shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
3. Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 546, 49 S.E. 668, 669 (1905). In its most recent
will-execution case, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that this remains the rule, i.e.,
the statute "must be strictly followed," but it then went on to render a decision that is difficult to defend under this theory. See Hampton Roads Seventh-Day Adventist Church v.
Stevens, 275 Va. 205, 211, 657 S.E.2d 80, 83 (2008), discussion infra Part IV.K. It is interesting to note that the revocable inter vivos trust, which is increasingly being used as the
primary vehicle for the disposition of one's estate at death, has no witnessing requirements or other formalities of execution, and yet there are no recorded Virginia cases where
this has led to or facilitated the fraudulent creation of a trust.
4. An early doubter was Lord Mansfield, who observed some 250 years ago that "[i]n
all my experience at the Court of Delegates, I never knew a fraudulent will, but what was
legally attested." Estate of Parsons, 163 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting
Wyndham v. Chetwynd, (1757) 96 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B.).
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sulted in the failure of numerous substantively valid wills,5 and
has led some courts to relax the Procrustean rigor with which
these requirements have been enforced in favor of a substantial
compliance approach.6 However, because of limitations inherent
in the substantial compliance approach, 7 this increasing dissatisfaction with strict compliance also led to the birth of the dispensation movement, which envisions a statute authorizing the trial
court to dispense with any one or more of the statutory formalities if the ultimate goal of the statute of wills is satisfied by clear
and convincing evidence.8
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL") amended the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC")
in 1990 in order to provide for such a dispensation statute,9 and
the statute has since been enacted by Colorado,10 Hawaii,11 Michigan,12 Montana,13 South Dakota,14 and Utah;15 endorsed by the
5. A "substantively valid will" is a testamentary writing which reflects a capacitated
person's intent and which is not the product of fraud, duress, or undue influence.
6. See the leading case In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1341-42 (N.J. 1991).
There are several Virginia cases that have provided a remedy in the name of substantial
compliance. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ward, 239 Va. 36, 42, 387 S.E.2d 735, 738-39 (1990);
Sturdivant v. Birchett, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 67, 74, 89 (1853). However, even if these tentative steps away from the rigid adherence to statutory formalities had become the rule of
law in Virginia, their limited applicability would represe::it an inferior solution to the
overall problem as noted in the following text.
7. For example, there is no way that a will with only one subscribing witness can be
said to have substantially complied with a statute that requires two.
8. For a more complete discussion of this subject in a Virginia context, see J. Rodney
Johnson, Dispensing with Wills Act Formalities for Substantively Valid Wills, 18 VA. B.
AsS'N J. 10 (1992), from which much of this paragraph is taken, and see also Kelly A. Har·
din, Note, An Analysis of the Virginia Wills Act Formalities and the Need for a Dispensing
Power Statute in Virginia, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1145 (1993).
9. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2007). This
section provides in its entirety as follows:
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in
compliance with [the statute of wills], the document or writing is treated as if
it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the
document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute (i) the decedent's will,
(ii) a partial or complete revocation of the will, (iii) an addition to or an alteration of the will, or (iv) a partial or complete revival of his [or her] formerly
revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion of the will.
Id.
10. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 15·11-503(1) (2006).
11. HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-503 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
12. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 700.2503 (West 2002).
13. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (2004).
14. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (2004).
15. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (Supp. 2007).
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Restatement of Property;16 and enacted, with modifications, by
the 2007 Session as Virginia Code section 64.1-49.1, "Writings intended as wills, etc."17 Although the Virginia dispensation statute
adopts the language of its UPC ancestor,18 it adds the three following restrictions: (1) a testator's signature may be dispensed
with in only two instances, i.e., (a) where the testator signs the
will's self-proving affidavit instead of the will itself, and (b)
crossed wills, where each of two testators, typically husband and
wife, inadvertently signs the other's will; (2) the remedy is not
available in informal probate before the clerk but only in inter
partes proceedings before the court; and (3) a proceeding in which
the dispensation remedy is sought must be brought within one
year of the decedent's death.19 It is believed that this forwardlooking legislation will (1) significantly reduce the growing volume of Virginia litigation focusing on the minutiae of will execution formalities, and (2) result in an increased honoring of Virginians' testamentary intent because wills that are substantively
valid will now be probatable notwithstanding technical defects in
their execution.20
B. Augmented Estate-Life Insurance-Retirement Benefits

Virginia's archaic, inadequate, and unfair laws purporting to
provide a surviving spouse with certain rights in a deceased
spouse's estate21 were replaced in 1991 by an augmented estate
regime modeled on the 1969 UPC in order to guarantee a surviving spouse a "fair share" of the value of all assets that the deceased spouse owned or controlled at death.22 From the very be-

16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
3.3 (1999).
17. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-49.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. If this remedy had been available to the parties in the recent case of Hampton
Roads Seventh-Day Adventist Church v. Stevens, 275 Va. 205, 657 S.E.2d 80 (2008), discussion infra Part IV.K., that case would have had its final resolution at the trial court
level.
21. These so-called "rights," i.e., dower and curtesy in real property and a forced statutory share in personal property, are discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, The Abolition of
Dower in Virginia: The Uniform Probate Code as an Alternative to Proposed Legislation, 7
U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1972), and J. Rodney Johnson, Interspousal Property Rights at Death,
(You Can't Take It with You, but You Can Prevent Your Spouse from Getting Any of It), 10
VA. B. Ass'N J. 10 (1984).
22. See J. William Gray, Jr., Virginia's Augmented Estate System: An Overview, 24 U.
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ginning, the General Assembly expressly provided, with qualifications not relevant to this discussion, that "the terms 'estate' and
'property' [as used in connection with the augmented estate] shall
include insurance policies, [and] retirement benefits ...."23 However, a 2006 decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia incorrectly
concluded that certain language in the Code, which was designed
to protect Virginia Retirement System administered group life insurance and retirement benefits from the reach of a beneficiary's
creditors, also prevented these assets from being included in an
insured's augmented estate.24 To negate any future application or
extension of this unfortunate decision, the 2007 Session amended
Virginia Code Sections 64.1-16.l(D) and 64.l-16.2(F) to provide:
All such insurance policies and other benefits are included in the
terms "estate" and "property" [as used in connection with the augmented estate] notwithstanding the presence of language contained
in any statute otherwise providing that neither they nor their
proceeds shall be liable to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution,
or other legal process or be seized, taken, appropriated, or applied by
any legal or equitable process or operation of law or any other such
similar language.25

C. ERISA Preemption-Insurance Beneficiary Revocation on
Divorce-Slayer Statute-Codified Constructive Trust
1. ERISA Preemption

In order to provide a uniform federal rule for employers, ERISA
preempts any state law that "relate[s] to" any ERISA-covered
employee benefit plan.26 In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the decedent's employerprovided insurance and pension plans were governed by ERISA,
that a Washington statute providing for the automatic revocation

RICH. L. REV. 513 (1990); J. William Gray, Jr., Administering the "Augmented" Estate, 17
VA. B. Ass'N J. 9 (1991).
23. VA. CODE ANN.§§ 64.1-16.l(D), -16.2(F) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
24. Sexton v. Cornett, 271 Va. 251, 255-57, 623 S.E.2d 898, 901--02 (2006). This opinion is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and
Estates, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 321, 338-41 (2006).
25. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-16.l(D), -16.2(F) (Repl. Vol. 2007). The rule of the Sexton
case was applied in a recent circuit court case because the decedent therein died in 2005,
prior to the effective date of this 2007 amendment. Higham v. Williams, CL-2006-11954,
2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 27 (Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 2008) (Fairfax County).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
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upon divorce of the decedent's beneficiary designations in favor of
his former wife related to ERISA, and therefore that the state
statute was preempted by ERISA.27 However, although ERISA
preempts such state statutes, it should not preempt a common
law remedy that prevents unjust enrichment in these cases by
imposing a constructive trust upon an unintended beneficiary after the benefits have been received.28 Moreover, NCCUSL believes that a state's codification of the common law constructive
trust in these circumstances will not offend ERISA, and thus it
has amended the UPC to provide such a remedy in section 2804(h)(2) .29 Although this UPC provision has been enacted in
Alaska,30 Colorado,31 Hawaii,32 Michigan,33 New Mexico,34 South
Dakota,35 and Utah,36 its validity has not yet been tested in the
Supreme Court of the United States.37

27. 532 U.S. 141, 146--47 (2001).
28. See Sarabeth A. Rayho, Note, Divorcees Turn About in Their Graves as Ex-Spouses
Cash In: Codified Constructive Trusts Ensure an Equitable Result Regarding ERISAGoverned Employee Benefit Plans, 106 MICH. L. REV. 373, 390 (2007). The author is in·
debted to Ms. Rayho for sharing with him a prepublication draft of her article, which collects all of the relevant authority, pro and con, and provides an excellent analysis thereof.
This material was very helpful during the legislative process leading up to the enactment
of the Virginia legislation described infra Part II.C.2-3.
29. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) cmt. (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 221 (1998).
The Commissioners' Official Comment to UPC § 2-804(h)(2) provides in part that:
This provision respects ERISA's concern that federal law govern the administration of the plan, while still preventing unjust enrichment that would result
if an unintended beneficiary were to receive the pension benefits. Federal law
has no interest in working a broader disruption of state probate and nonprobate transfer law than is required in the interest of smooth administration of
pension and employee benefit plans.
Id.
30. ALASKA STAT.§ 13.12.804 (2006).
31. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 15-11-804(8)(b) (2006).
32. HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-804 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2809(2) (West 2002).
34. N.M. STAT.§ 45-2-804(1) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
35. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-804(h)(2) (2004).
36. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75·2·804(8)(b) (Supp. 2007).
37. It should be noted that although this legislation was prompted by the specter of
ERISA preemption, it is not a narrow statute limited to ERISA but, instead, it is a broad
remedy available whenever there is a preemption by any federal law. If, nevertheless, this
codification of the common law constructive trust should be found to be a state statute
that "relates to"-and thus is preempted by-ERISA, such a decision should not affect the
availability of a constructive trust as a common law remedy. And, if the Supreme Court of
the United States should determine that state common law remedies are also preempted
by ERISA, the Court could still impose a constructive trust by an application of federal
common law. For a discussion of federal common law in this context, see Rayho, supra
note 28, at 384-87. For an application of federal common law in Virginia, in the context of
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2. Revocation of Death Benefits on Divorce in Virginia
Section 20-111.1 of the Code of Virginia, which provides for the
revocation of death benefits in favor of a former spouse upon divorce or annulment,38 would render the same result as the Washington statute in Egelhoff and thus, in cases dealing with death
benefits arising under ERISA covered plans, this code section
would be preempted because it "relates to" ERISA. To prevent
this or any other federal preemption from affecting the final result in any case, the 2007 Session followed the recommendation of
NCCUSL and amended section 20-111.1 by adding thereto the relevant language of UPC section 2-804(h)(2) to provide for a codified constructive trust remedy if the statute is preempted by
any39 federal law.40
3. Virginia Slayer Statute

It is a fundamental rule of Virginia's public policy that a person
should not profit as a result of the person's own wrong. In order to
prevent one of the most reprehensible violations of this public policy, Virginia enacted a "slayer statute" to prohibit one who is convicted of the murder of another41 from taking an economic benefit
the slayer statute, see Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Riner, 351 F. Supp. 2d
492 (W.D. Va. 2005), aff'd sub nom. Connecticut Life Insurance Co. v. Estate of Riner, 142
Fed. Appx. 690 (4th Cir. 2005).
38. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-111.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008). "The term 'death benefit' includes any
payments under a life insurance contract, annuity, retirement arrangement, compensation
agreement or other contract designating a beneficiary of any right, property or money in
the form of a death benefit." Id.
39. Note that the amendment is not confined to cases where the federal preemption is
because of ERISA; such a restriction might cause a court to determine that the amendment "relates to" ERISA and thus it would itself be preempted.
40. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-111.l(D) (Repl. Vol. 2008). The Virginia provision reads in full
as follows:
If this section is preempted by federal law with respect to the payment of any
death benefit, a former spouse who, not for value, receives the payment of
any death benefit that the former spouse is not entitled to under this section
is personally liable for the amount of the payment to the person who would
have been entitled to it were this section not preempted.
Id.
41. The statute, as in force in 2007, was also applicable to a person found to be a murderer by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil proceeding where the person "is not
available for prosecution by reason of his death by suicide or otherwise." Id. § 55-401
(Repl. Vol. 2007). The 2008 Session enlarged the definition of "slayer'' to include voluntary
manslaughter. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 830, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-401). This and the other 2008 amendments to the slayer statute are
discussed in Part III.A., infra.
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from that person by deed, will, intestacy, insurance, etc.42 In the
present context, the rather obvious question is whether, when the
benefits in question are flowing from an employer-provided benefit plan, the slayer statute "relates to" ERISA and thus would be
preempted. When this question was collaterally raised in Egelhoff, the Supreme Court of the United States noted, in dicta, that
almost all of the states have such statutes, that these statutes
pre-date ERISA, "[a]nd because the statutes are more or less uniform nationwide, their interference with the aims of ERISA is at
least debatable."43 However, even though the validity of slayer
statutes vis-a-vis ERISA remains an open question in the Supreme Court of the United States,44 the 2007 Session also
amended Virginia's slayer statute by adding UPC-suggested language45 to provide for a codified constructive trust remedy if any
court should decide that the slayer statute is preempted by any
federal law. 46

D. Charitable Trusts-Modification, Termination, or Sale of
Realty-Public Notice

It is· accepted common law that, although the public, or some
reasonably large segment thereof, is the ultimate beneficiary of a
charitable trust, no member of the public has any right to participate in any legal proceedings seeking the modification or termination of the trust, or the sale of its real property; instead, the

42. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-401 to -415 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008). The background of this statute is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 68 VA.
L. REV. 521, 525-28 (1982).
43. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001).
44. In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Riner, the court held that even if Virginia's slayer statute was preempted by ERISA, federal common law would prevent a life
insurance beneficiary convicted of murdering the insured from profiting by this wrong. 351
F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 (W.D. Va. 2005), aff'd sub nom. Connecticut General Life Insurance
Co. v. Estate of Riner, 142 Fed. Appx. 690 (4th Cir. 2005).
45. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(i)(2) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 213 (1998).
46. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-414(B) (Supp. 2008). The Virginia provision reads in full
as follows:
If this chapter or any part thereof is preempted by federal law with respect to
a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this chapter,
any person who, not for value, receives a payment, an item of property, or
any other benefit to which he is not entitled under this chapter, shall return
that payment, item of property, or other benefit or be liable for the amount of
the payment or the value of the property or benefit to the person who would
have been entitled to it were this chapter or part thereof not preempted.
Id.
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public's interest in such matters is represented by the Attorney
General.47 A logical extension of this rule, which provides that as
the general public has no right to participate in such matters it
has no right to receive any notice thereof, generated significant
interest in an unreported circuit court case dealing with the sale
of certain charitable real estate in the City of Richmond in 2005.
The members of the neighborhood in which the realty was located, who did not learn of the proposed sale until after it had
been authorized by the court and the property was being advertised, believed that they had relevant information which, had it
been considered by the court, would have led to a different outcome. 48 However, notwithstanding the Attorney General's willingness to argue these points on behalf of the neighborhood
members, final judgment on the trustee's right to sell had already
been entered in the circuit court proceeding.49
To prevent such results in the future, the 2007 Session
amended the notice provisions of the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC")
to require petitioners to give notice "if the proceeding seeks the
modification or termination of a charitable trust or the sale of any
of its real estate, to the public at large by order of publication
published once a week for three consecutive weeks prior to any
hearing or trial .... "50 However, as noted supra in footnote 4 7,
this notice provision does not change the common law rule that
members of the public at large have no right to participate in
such proceedings. "The purpose of the notice, which shall be
stated therein, is solely to make the public aware of the nature of
such proceedings, the remedy being sought therein, and the opportunity to share their views in regard thereto with the Attorney
General."51 It is believed that this public interest legislation is a
salutary solution to a longstanding problem in the law of charita-

47. Notwithstanding the acceptance of this rule, it is difficult to find any case making
a clear statement thereof. For this reason, and also to ensure that this remains the rule,
the legislation being reported upon provides in part that "[t]his notice provision does not
change the common law rule that members of the public at large are not entitled to be parties to such judicial proceedings or to have any right to appear therein." Id.
§ 55-542.06(A)(3)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
48. See Scott Bass, Windsor Farms Braces for Brouhaha, STYLE WKLY., Sept. 13, 2006,
available at http://www.styleweekly.com/article.asp?idarticle=l2963.
49. See id.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-542.06(A)(3)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2007). The amendment further
provides that "[t]he court shall not conduct any hearing or trial until it has made a finding
that the required notice to the public has been given as specified herein." Id.
51. Id.
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ble trusts and one that is worthy of being considered in other jurisdictions.

E. The Doctrine of Worthier Title-Abolished
The common law Doctrine of Worthier Title ("DWT") held that
if Grantor conveyed realty to X for life, with the remainder to
Grantor's heirs, the remainder was void.52 Thus, the state of the
title in such a case would be "life estate in X, followed by a reversion in fee simple in Grantor." Upon Grantor's death, this reversion would pass to Grantor's heirs53 by intestate succession because wills were not allowed at common law prior to the Statute
of Wills in 1540. Thus, the intended persons, Grantor's heirs,
would still take the property but, instead of taking it by deed,
they would take it by intestacy, which was said to be the "worthier title."54 Subsequent American developments resulted in
DWT being extended to personalty and, in many jurisdictions, being changed from a rule of law to a canon of construction.55
The U.S. Congress passed legislation in 1993 that allows the
assets of a person who is under age 65 and disabled pursuant to
the Sccial Security Act definition to be used to create a Special
Needs Trust ("SNT') for the person's own benefit that will not
count as a resource in determining the person's eligibility for Medicaid.56 When trial courts create a SNT for such a disabled person, frequently using assets from the person's tort claim recovery,57 the courts typically require that any remainder following
the disabled person's death (after repaying the state for all Medicaid expenditures) go to the person's "heirs." This practice presents a problem when DWT is a part of state law because it
enables the Social Security Administration to maintain that DWT

52. The operative fact is the attempted remainder to Grantor's heirs, which led to the
rule's alternative name--the rule prohibiting remainders to the grantor's heirs.
53. Although the rule and this paragraph speak in the plural, it should be noted that
in most common law cases there would be a single heir-Grantor's eldest son, pursuant to
the doctrine of primogeniture.
54. This intestate passage would also result in the feudal equivalent of death taxes
having to be paid, a result that would not occur if the property had passed inter vivos to
Grantor's heirs.
55. For the common law history of DWT, see the highly respected opinion of Judge
Benjamin F. Cardozo in Doctor v. Hughes, 122 N.E. 221 (N.Y. 1919).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2000).
57. The same would be true when a court authorizes a disabled person's guardian to
create a SNT with other assets of the disabled person.
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voids the intended remainder to the disabled person's heirs, thereby leaving this interest in the disabled person as a reversion.
Thus, as the disabled person now owns all of the interests in the
trust (i.e., the life estate and the reversion) it becomes a revocable
trust in fact, even though it is expressly stated to be irrevocable,
and therefore not entitled to SNT treatment.58
It is clear that DWT was a part of Virginia law when the 2007
Session began, although it is uncertain whether it existed as a
rule of law or as a canon of construction.59 It was also clear that
DWT no longer served any necessary or desirable function in Virginia law. Thus, in order to prevent the above-described SNT
problems from arising in Virginia, the 2007 Session added section
55-14.1 to the Code to provide that "[t]he doctrine of worthier title
is abolished in this Commonwealth as a rule oflaw and as a rule
of construction."60

F. Fiduciary Investments-''Mini" Legal List-$100,000
Immunity -Uniform Transfers to Minors Act-Uniform
Custodial Trust Act
This topic has been the subject of several reports in these pages, the most recent of which, in 2005, treated it at such length61
that it is unnecessary to plow the same ground again. Accordingly, the 2005 report is hereby incorporated by reference, with the
following changes due to amendments enacted by the 2007 Session: (1) The 2005 amendment is repealed;62 (2) the immunity of
the mini legal list is limited to $100,000, absent court action;63 (3)

58. This paragraph's summary does not treat all matters relevant to SNTs, but it is
believed to be sufficient for its purpose, which is to illustrate the problem presented to the
2007 Session. For a complete and excellent discussion of this subject, see Andrew H. Hook
& Thomas D. Begley, Jr., When Is an Irrevocable Special Needs Trust Considered To Be
Revocable?, 31 EST. PLAN. 205 (2004).
59. See Braswell v. Braswell, 195 Va. 971, 974-75, 81 S.E.2d 560, 562 (1954).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-14.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007). This language is identical to the first
sentence of UPC § 2-710. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-710 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 204
(1998). The remainder of that section was thought to be unnecessary to accomplish the
desired goal.
61. See J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates,
40 U. RICH. L. REV. 381, 383-86 (2005).
62. See Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 517, 2007 Va. Acts 601 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 26-40.0l(E) (Cum. Supp. 2007)). This amendment provided that "[n]othing in
this section shall relieve a fiduciary of his obligation, pursuant to § 26-45.3, to comply with
the provisions of the prudent investor rule." Id.
63. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-40.0l(E) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
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the immunity of the mini legal list is extended to custodians under the Virginia Uniform Transfers to Minors Act and custodial
trustees under the Virginia Uniform Custodial Trust Act64 who
are otherwise subject to Virginia's Prudent Investor Act.65

G. Incarcerated Felons-Civil Disabilities-Testamentary
Capacity
It appeared from anecdotal evidence offered to the 2007 Session
that far too many lawyers and judges subscribe to a belief in the
civiliter mortuus of felons while incarcerated, i.e., that they are
treated the same as those who have been adjudicated as incapacitated persons, vis-a-vis their legal inability to manage their own
property and business affairs. However, this is true only in those
cases where the court has appointed a committee for a felon,66
and, again, anecdotal evidence indicates that this rarely happens.
Thus, in almost all cases, the incarcerated felon enjoys the same
legal rights vis-a-vis his property and business affairs as any other person.67 In an attempt to clarify this matter, and to provide
some certainty for the commercial community, the 2007 Session
codified the Virginia common law rule by providing that "until a
committee is appointed, such [incarcerated felon] shall continue
to have the same capacity, rights, powers, and authority over his
estate, affairs, and property that he had prior to such conviction
and sentencing."68 And, breaking new ground, the 2007 Session

The presumption under subsection B shall apply to (i) a fiduciary only for a
calendar year in which the value of the intangible personal property under
the fiduciary's control or management does not exceed $100,000 at the begin.
ning of such year, or (ii) a fiduciary who, on motion for good cause shown, has
obtained express authorization from the court having jurisdiction over such
fiduciary for the presumption under subsection B to apply.

Id.
64. See id. § 26-40.0l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
65. See id. § 26-45.13 (Cum. Supp. 2008); § 31-48(B) (Cum. Supp. 2008) (Custodial
Trust Act);§ 55-34.7 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (Transfers to Minors Act).
66. Id.§ 53.1-221 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
67. See Haynes v. Peterson, 125 Va. 730, 734, 100 S.E. 471, 472 (1919). Note, however,
that for purposes of title 8.01 of the Code, the definition of "person under a disability" includes "a person convicted of a felony during the period he is confined." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.0l-2(6)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
68. Id.§ 53.1-221(D) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
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further provided that "[a] person for whom a committee is appointed . . . is not thereby deprived of the capacity to make a
will."69

H. Doctrine of Exoneration-Abolished for Devises and Legacies
Reversing the common law rule that testamentary recipients of
property subject to an encumbrance upon which the testator is
personally liable are entitled to have this encumbrance satisfied
from other assets of the estate, the 2007 Session enacted Virginia
Code section 64.1-157.1 to provide that, "[u]nless a contrary intent is clearly set out in the will, 70 a specific devise or bequest of
real or personal property passes, subject to any mortgage, pledge,
security interest, or other lien existing at the date of death of the
testator, without the right of exoneration."71 However, this rule
will not apply if the encumbrance in question was placed upon
the property by (1) an agent acting pursuant to a durable general
power of attorney72 for an incapacitated73 testator, unless "thereafter ratified by the testator when he is not incapacitated,"74 or
(2) "a conservator, guardian or committee of the testator ... [unless] there is an adjudication that the testator's disability has
ceased and the testator survives that adjudication by at least one
year."75
One issue not addressed by this legislation relates to the increasing number of cases where inter vivos trusts are being used
as will substitutes. Suppose, for instance, X contributes property

69. Id.
70. On this point, the new statute also provides that "[a] general directive in the will
to pay debts shall not be evidence of a contrary intent ... ."Id. § 64.1-157.l(A) (Repl. Vol.
2007).
71. Id.
72. This exception will not apply if the power "was limited to one or more specific purposes and was not general in nature." Id.§ 64.1-157.l(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
73. This portion of the statute reads as follows:
For the purposes of this section, (i) no adjudication of the testator's incapacity
is necessary, (ii) the acts of an agent within the authority of a durable power
of attorney are rebuttably presumed to be for an incapacitated testator, and
(iii) an incapacitated person is one who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs,
chronic intoxication or other cause creating a lack of sufficient understanding
or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions.

Id.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.§ 64.1-157.l(C) (Rep!. Vol. 2007).
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subject to an encumbrance upon which X is personally liable to
X's inter vivos trust, and the trust provides for the transfer of this
property to B at X's death. If, at X's death, any portion of this indebtedness remains unpaid, the duty of X's personal representative to pay X's debts will result in the exoneration of the property
going to B. Although it would appear that the same considerations leading to the new anti-exoneration rule for wills would also
be applicable to will substitutes, the new statute does not address
the latter.76 It would also appear that the new rule will likely
generate a new set of practical problems in the administration of
decedents' estates as executors deal with affected devisees and legatees in cases where the encumbrance may be thought to exceed
the value of the property, or cases where the devisee or legatee
wishes to receive the property but does not have the funds with
which to satisfy the indebtedness, cannot borrow the same, and
the obligee is unwilling to enter into a novation accepting the devisee or legatee as the sole party liable for the debt and releasing
the estate from liability thereon.

I. UTC-Transfers to Trusts
Unlike a corporation, a trust is not a legal entity capable of
holding title to property; title to its property is vested in its trustee. Unfortunately, too many lawyers are unaware of this distinction and of the corresponding rule that conveyances intended for
the benefit of a trust's beneficiaries are to be made "to the trustee
of the XYZ trust," instead of "to the XYZ trust," and this has led
to too many incorrectly drafted transfer documents. To remedy
this problem, the 2007 Session amended Virginia Code section 55548.10 to provide that "[a] deed or other instrument purporting to
convey or transfer real or personal property to a trust instead of
to the trustee or trustees of the trust shall be deemed to convey or
transfer such property to the trustee or trustees as fully as if
made directly to the trustee or trustees."77

76. The same consideration will apply to other instances of encumbered properties
passing outside of probate, where the decedent is personally liable thereon, such as survivorship tenancies, transfer on death property, payable on death property, etc., although in
the survivorship tenancies, the survivor's right of exoneration from the decedent's probate
estate will be limited to the decedent's proportionate share of the obligation. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 96 S.E.2d 788 (1957).
77. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-548.lO(E) (Rep!. Vol. 2007).
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J. Insolvent Estates-Priority of Debts
Virginia Code section 64.1-15 7 establishes the priorities in
which claims against an insolvent decedent's estate are to be
paid. The 2007 Session promoted "[d]ebts and taxes due localities
and municipal corporations of the Commonwealth" from the last
category of "[a]ll other claims" into a new category of its own,
immediately preceding the "[a]ll other claims" category.78
K. Incapacitated Persons-Conservator's Sale of Realty-

Restrictions
Virginia Code section 37.2-1023(B) authorizes circuit court
judges to impose certain enumerated requirements upon conservators seeking to convey an incapacitated person's realty.79 The
2007 Session amended this provision by adding another permissible condition thereto, "requiring the use of a common source information company, as defined in§ 54.1-2130,80 when listing the
property."81
L. Retirement Benefits-Exemption from Creditor Claims-

Bankruptcy Conformity
The 2007 Session amended Virginia Code section 34-34 so that
it matches the state exemption of retirement benefits to the exemption permitted under new federal bankruptcy law.82
M. Uniform Transfers to Minors Act -Use of Property-

Termination
The 2007 Session amended Virginia Code section 31-50, which
deals with the custodian's use of custodial property, by adding
language providing that "[a]t any time a custodian may, without

78. Id.§ 64.1-157(8)-(9) (Supp. 2008).
79. See id.§ 37.2-1023(B) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
80. "'Common source information company' means any person, firm, or corporation
that is a source, compiler, or supplier of information regarding real estate for sale or lease
and other data and includes, but is not limited to, multiple listing services." Id. § 54.12130 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
81. Id.§ 37.2-1023(B)(v) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
82. See Act of Mar. 12, 2007, ch. 302, 2007 Va. Acts 428 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 34-34 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
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court order, transfer all or part of the custodial property to a
qualified minor's trust.83 Such a transfer terminates the custodianship to the extent of the custodial property transferred."84
N. Power of Attorney-Removal of Agent for Cause-Attorney

Fees
Along with the increasing use of durable powers of attorney for
the management of a functionally incapacitated (but not adjudicated) person's property has come an increase in the instances of
agents abusing their powers thereunder and, not surprisingly, an
increase in the number of circuit court cases seeking the removal
of such agents. One of the factors preventing more cases from being brought is the inability or unwillingness of family members to
advance the necessary attorney fees which, under the American
legal system, are not recoverable from the agent even if the family prevails. To help remedy this problem, the 2007 Session
amended Virginia Code section 11-9.1 to provide that "[i]f an
agent is removed by the court because of abuse, neglect or exploitation of the principal, all fees and costs associated with the removal proceeding, including the attorney's fees of the prevailing
party, shall be borne by the agent."85

0. UTC-Beneficiary's Right to Information-Trustee's Duty
Many settlors of inter vivos trusts have a desire to keep the
terms and provisions thereof as private as possible, and this desire often extends to withholding significant trust-related information from the beneficiaries themselves.86 Virginia's enactment
of the UTC advanced the interests of the beneficiaries in this regard by providing that "[u]nless unreasonable under the circumstances, a trustee shall promptly respond to a beneficiary's request

83. "'Qualified minor's trust' means any trust (including a trust created by a custodian) that meets the requirements of § 2503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and
the regulations implementing that section." VA. CODE ANN. § 31-37 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
84. Id. § 31-50 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
85. Id. § 11-9.l(D) (Cum. Supp. 2008). For reasons that are unknown, this same legislation also codified one of the most basic rules of the common law, viz: "The agent stands
in a fiduciary relationship to the principal by whom he was appointed and may be held
liable for a breach of any fiduciary duty to the principal." Id. § 11-9.l(C) (Supp. 2007).
86. See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 253 Va. 30, 35, 480 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1997), discussed in J.
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 31 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1249, 1277-78 (1997).
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for information related to the administration of the trust."87 The
pendulum swung back to the settlors' side in 2007 as the General
Assembly effectively gelded this rule by providing that
[a] trustee who fails to furnish information to a beneficiary or respond to a request for information regarding the administration of
the trust in a good faith belief that to do so would be unreasonable
under the circumstances or contrary to the purposes of the settlor
shall not be subject to removal or other sanctions therefor.88

Thus, if a settlor clearly states that privacy/secrecy is a trust
purpose, even insofar as beneficiaries are concerned, then the
trustee who refuses a beneficiary's request for information "in a
good faith belief that to do so would be ... contrary to the purposes of the settlor shall not be subject to removal or other sanctions
therefor."89 If this language receives a literal interpretation in the
courts, it will be game, set, and match for settlor.
P. UTC-Mandatory Rules

One of the mandatory rules of the UTC that cannot be overridden by the terms of a trust, the trustee's duty to act in accordance with the purposes of the trust, was expanded by the 2007
Session to a duty to act in accordance with "the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries."90
Q. UTC-Creditors' Rights-Mandatory Distribution

Even in the case of a spendthrift trust, a beneficiary's creditors
can reach a mandatory distribution due but unpaid to the beneficiary while it is still in the trustee's possession if the distribution
is not made "within a reasonable time after the designated distribution date."91 For the purposes of this rule, the 2007 Session
added a definition of "mandatory distribution"92 that, with one

87. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-548.13(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007). This subsection also provides that
"[a] trustee shall keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about
the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to protect
their interests." Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. This provision also reverses the rule of the common law. See Fletcher, 253 Va.
at 35, 480 S.E.2d at 491, discussed in Johnson, supra note 86, at 1277-78.
90. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-541.05(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
91. Id.§ 55-545.06(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
92. Id. § 55-545.06(A) (Rep!. Vol. 2007).
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possible exception, is reasonably obvious and should admit of
straight-forward application. The potentially troublesome language states that "[t]he term does not include a distribution subject to the exercise of the trustee's discretion even if ... (ii) the
terms of the trust authorizing a distribution use language of discretion with language of direction."93 Taking into account the
many word choices available to drafting attorneys and the imagination of litigators, this exception for distributions that "use language of discretion with language of direction" may prove to be
troublesome in some cases.

R. Durable Power of Attorney-Non-Judicial AccountingJudicial Discovery
The 1995 Session responded to the problem of an agent for a
functionally incapacitated (but not adjudicated) principal who refuses to provide members of the principal's family with any information regarding the principal's affairs by creating (1) a nonjudicial accounting remedy in favor of a person "interested in the
welfare of a principal"94 who is "unable to properly attend to his
affairs,"95 and (2) a judicial discovery remedy in favor of these
same persons when the desired information is not forthcoming or
where further action against the agent might be in order.96 The
2007 Session expanded the operation of these remedies by (1)
changing the reference from a principal who "is unable to properly attend to his affairs," to one who is "believed to be unable to attend to his affairs," (2) allowing the remedies to be pursued after
the principal's death, (3) extending the duration of the accounting
period from two to five years, (4) providing for access to the judicial discovery remedy if the agent fails to respond to a request for
a non-judicial accounting within sixty days, and (5) expanding the
scope of judicial discovery to cases where property recovery or
personal liability might be the ultimate goal.97

93. Id.
94. This term is defined in VA. CODE ANN.§ 37.2-1018(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
95. This term is defined in VA. CODE ANN.§ 37.2-1018(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
96. This development is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1175, 1176-79 (1995).
97. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 11-9.6, 37.2-1018(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
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Ill. 2008 LEGISLATION

A. Slayer Statutes-Revision-Clarification-Voluntary
Manslaughter Problem
It is a fundamental rule of Virginia's public policy that a criminal should not profit as a result of his crime. In order to prevent
one of the most reprehensible violations of this public policy, i.e.,
a murderer taking an economic benefit from his victim by deed,
will, intestacy, insurance, etc., Virginia has a "slayer statute"
which traces its antecedents back to 1919,98 and which evolved
over the years into a comprehensive set of rules enacted by the
1981 Session entitled "Acts Barring Property Rights."99 The 2008
Session amended a number of these rules based upon a study and
recommendations by the Virginia Bar Association (''VBA"), and it
also made an amendment, opposed by the VBA, to another
rule.100 This report will deal with the enacted VBA recommendations (House Bill No. 949) in Section 1, the other enacted recommendation (Senate Bill No. 450) in Section 2, and then present
their combined definition of the term "slayer" in Section 3.
1. House Bill No. 949

The space constraints of this survey article preclude a complete
discussion of these enactments, but they may be summarized as
follows: (1) the definition of "slayer" in Virginia Code section 55401 was expanded to include one "who is determined, whether be-

98. The history of the slayer statute can be found in Life Insurance Co. of Virginia v.
Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410, 412-13 (E.D. Va. 1962).
99. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-401 to -415 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008). This legislation was based upon a proposed Model Act drafted by John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1936). For a
discussion of Virginia law prior to this legislation, and the language recommended for
enactment, see Sandra Gross Schneider, Comment, Barring Slayers' Acquisition of Property Rights in Virginia: A Proposed Statute, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 251 (1979). For a discussion
of the Virginia legislation as amended and enacted, see J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts,
and Estates, 68 VA. L. REV. 521, 525-28 (1982).
100. The VBA recommendations were contained in House Bill No. 949; the recommendation opposed by the VBA was contained in Senate Bill No. 450. These two bills were conformed during the legislative process (i.e., each one was amended to contain the contents
of both), contrary to the wishes of the VBA, and both bills were enacted. H.B. 949, Va.
Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts
_j; S.B. 450, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch.
830, 2008 Va. Acts _J.
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fore or after his death, by a court of appropriate jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence to have committed" the offense in
question;lOl (2) the language preventing any "person claiming
through" a slayer from taking was amended in two code sections
to clarify that (a) it referred to one deriving title through the
slayer as a "transferee, assignee or other" person claiming
through him,102 and (b) it did not refer to "[a]n heir or distributee
who establishes his kinship to the decedent by way of his kinship
to a slayer ....";103 (3) the rule preventing the anti-lapse statute
from applying to a testamentary provision for a slayer was reversed;104 (4) the misleading titles of the two sections dealing
with concurrent ownership were clarified;105 (5) the language ex-

101. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-401 (Supp. 2008)). This opportunity to apply the slayer statute in a civil proceeding in cases where a conviction is not obtained in a criminal prosecution is sometimes
referred to as an "O.J." remedy because of its application under California law to a famous
football player with that nickname.
102. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-402 (Supp. 2008)). In consequence of this change, the "through" language in the
insurance section (§ 55-411) had no further operation except as a "corruption of the blood"
provision that penalizes an innocent party for the wrongs of another. Thus, it was deleted
as contrary to Virginia's public policy. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 554ll(A) (Supp. 2008)).
103. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-403 (Supp. 2008)).
104. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-404 (Supp. 2008)). When this provision was enacted in 1980, Virginia had one of
the broadest anti-lapse statutes in the country; it was applicable to any beneficiary predeceasing the testator leaving children or descendants of deceased children. See Act of Mar.
31, 1980, ch. 454, 1980 Acts 522 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-64 (Rep!.
Vol. 1980) (repealed 1985)). As the anti-lapse statute is now restricted to cases where the
substituted beneficiaries are also close kindred of the testator, see VA. CODE ANN. § 64.164.1 (Rep!. Vol. 2007), it was determined that the former provision was inconsistent with
the intestate succession rule found in section 55-403 and also amounted to a "corruption of
the blood" contrary to Virginia's public policy.
105. See Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 55-405 to -406 (Supp. 2008)). Until 1992, a "slayer" of a cotenant in a tenancy involving survivorship rights was prohibited from acquiring the cotenant's half-interest
by survivorship; instead, the death of the cotenant caused a severance of the tenancy and
the slain tenant's half-interest passed with his other property by will or intestate succession (but not to the slayer). The 1992 amendment to section 55-406 continued this rule as
to cotenancies not involving survivorship. But, with regard to every form of survivorship
tenancy, the 1992 amendment to section 55-405 provided for the passing of the slayer's
interest to the estate of the decedent as if the slayer had predeceased the decedent. However, the failure to make corresponding changes in the titles of these two sections has
created a certain confusion that the 2008 amendments now eliminate by retitling section 55-405 as "Concurrent ownership with survivorship," and section 55-406 as "Concurrent ownership without survivorship." For a discussion of the 1992 legislation, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 26 U. RICH. L.
REV. 873, 895-96 (1992). The 2008 amendments also rewrote the final clause of section 55406 which, since the 1992 amendments, had erroneously referred to survivorship concerns
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empting life insurance companies from liability on policies "procured and maintained by the slayer or on which all the premiums
were paid by him," was replaced with language focusing on policies procured within two years of the insured's death as part of a
plan to murder the insured;106 and (6) the chapter's construction
section was amended to expressly state that its provisions are not
exclusive,107 and that "all common law rights and remedies that
prevent one who has participated in the willful and unlawful killing of another from profiting by his wrong shall continue to exist
in the Commonwealth."108
2. Senate Bill No. 450
The 2008 Session adopted a further amendment to Virginia
Code section 55-401 which expanded the definition of "slayer" to
include a person convicted of voluntary manslaughter or who,
though not so convicted, is found guilty thereof by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil proceeding brought before or after
his death.109 This legislative proposal was introduced in response
to a 2007 federal district court case, Boston Mutual Life Insurance Co. u. Ludwig, in which the court stated the issue to be
"whether a person convicted of voluntary manslaughter, but not
murder, is precluded as a beneficiary of the decedent's life insurance proceeds by the slayer statute in Pennsylvania or Virginia."110 Although Pennsylvania law was found to be controlling,
the court noted in dicta that
even if Virginia law applied, the result would be the same since Virginia's common law rule that no person shall be allowed to profit by
his own wrong has not been abrogated by any act of the General Assembly, thereby precluding a person convicted of voluntary manslaughter from receiving life insurance proceeds.111

in this non-survivorship section.
106. The legislation as introduced provided for the complete repeal of this provision.
The enacted language is the result of conferences between the VBA, certain insurance industry representatives, and the bill's patron.
107. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-414(A) (Supp. 2008)). This provision is a codification of Peoples Security Life Insurance Co. v. Arrington, 243 Va. 89, 92, 412 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1992).
108. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-414(A) (Supp. 2008)).
109. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 830, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-401 (Supp. 2008)).
l10. No. 1:06CV1072(JCC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34812, at *l (E.D. Va. May 10,
2007).
111. Id. at *17.
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Nevertheless, the fact that the Virginia slayer statute contained no provision expressly requiring such a result prompted
the introduction of Senate Bill No. 450 to add a person convicted
of voluntary manslaughter to the statute's definition of "slayer."112
However, it is submitted that this lack of an express provision
in the slayer statute presented no real problem in light of other
applicable case law113 and the intended solution to the perceived
problem has, itself, created a significant problem in the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth. It is a regrettable fact that there are
some premeditated homicide cases where, although a murder
conviction is sought (and deserved), the Commonwealth accepts a
plea to voluntary manslaughter because of an evidentiary problem, or a divided jury returns a compromise verdict of voluntary
manslaughter, etc. On the other hand, there are a number of nonpremeditated homicide cases that will also result in a voluntary
manslaughter conviction, such as: (1) the classic case of the
abused spouse who finally snaps and strikes back with excessive
force; (2) the spouse who catches the other in an act of adultery

112. S.B. 450, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch.
830, 2008 Va. Acts __j. As introduced, the bill also sought to include involuntary manslaughter in the definition of "slayer." S.B. 450, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
113. In addition to the dicta in Boston, there is a 1962 federal district court case arising
in the Eastern District of Virginia, with facts parallel to those in Boston, where the court,
recognizing that there were no Virginia cases on point, refused to allow the spouse convicted of voluntary manslaughter to take, noting that,
There can be no doubt that the general rule, followed probably universally, is
that a beneficiary of an insurance policy who kills the insured by murder or
voluntary manslaughter cannot take the proceeds of the policy. This is because of the ancient common law doctrine that no man shall be allowed to
profit by his own wrong.
Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410, 411 (E.D. Va. 1962). The court in Boston
appears to have reached its conclusions without an awareness of this case, as it is not referenced therein.
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court of Virginia held in 1992 that the General
Assembly did not abrogate the common law when it enacted the slayer statute. Peoples
Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Arrington, 243 Va. 89, 92, 412 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1992). And, it might be
further noted that one of the VBA's enacted recommendations was a codification of the
Peoples holding along with additional consequential language flowing from this codification. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.

2008]

WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES

457

and kills in the heat of passion; (3) cases involving mutual combat, e.g., two family members fighting and one dies; and (4) cases
of imperfect self-defense.114
It is clear that the actors in all of these non-premeditated manslaughter cases are "wrong" in what they do, and they are subject
to appropriate punishment in the criminal law courts that takes
into account all of the circumstances of their cases. But, adding
"voluntary manslaughter" to the definition of "slayer" in section
55-401 also imposes a mandatory forfeiture of any inheritance or
other assets "from" the decedent in all of these cases-regardless
of the circumstances-with the court being powerless to prevent
or reduce it. However, the common law remedy of constructive
trust (which would be the remedy in the absence of the amendment in question) would provide a flexible rule in these caseswith the court determining whether or not, under the unique circumstances of a particular case, a forfeiture would be appropriate
and, if so, to what extent.

In the preceding paragraph, reference was made to a mandatory forfeiture of any inheritance or other assets "from" a decedent.
The word "from" was placed in quotation marks because the
magnitude of the forfeiture in a number of cases will be far greater than the word "from" might otherwise suggest. For example, in
the case of the abused spouse, it is not unrealistic to assume that
in some cases the title to "their" property might be in the deceased abuser's sole name-and yet the statute mandates a forfeiture of the entire property in every case, with the court being unable to make any exceptions.115 Moreover, even if the couples in
the abuse and the adultery cases mentioned above hold their
property as tenants by the entirety, or joint tenants with the
right of survivorship, the surviving spouse will forfeit both halves
of the property under the slayer statute (not just the decedent's
half) because section 55-405 mandates that survivorship property

114. In addition to the number of persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter in such
criminal prosecutions, the number of persons affected by this amendment will be increased by (1) those whom the Commonwealth decided should not be prosecuted; (2) those
whom a grand jury failed to indict; and (3) those who were tried but acquitted, but who, in
any of these three instances, are later found in a civil proceeding to have committed the
offense.
115. This would be the statutory mandate even if the abused spouse had been primarily responsible for the property's acquisition by making the house payments, car payments,
etc.
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pass "as though the slayer had predeceased the decedent."116
Thus, the fact of the statute's mandatory forfeiture in voluntary
manslaughter cases where a chancellor would not impose a constructive trust is made even worse by the magnitude of the forfeiture that will occur in some of them. It is to be hoped that this
state of the law will not be suffered to exist any longer than is necessary for its correction.
3. The Enacted Legislation
As a result of the 2008 Session's action in conforming House
Bill No. 949 and Senate Bill No. 450, and passing both of them,
the slayer statute's enacted definition of "slayer" now reads as follows:
"Slayer" shall mean any person (i) who is convicted of the murder or
voluntary manslaughter of the decedent or, (ii) in the absence of such
conviction, who is determined, whether before or after his death, by a
court of appropriate jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence
to have committed one of the offenses listed in subdivision (i) resulting in the death of the decedent.117

In all other respects, the enacted legislation is as noted in Section 1 of this Paragraph A.118

B. Wills-Self-Proving Affidavit-Notarial Seal
Prior to 1977, the statutory form for an affidavit that would
make a will self-proving provided for the officer before whom the
affidavit was executed to affix the officer's official seal thereto.
The 1977 Session removed the "seal" requirement from the statutory form119 and the Code presently provides that the affidavit
will be effective "notwithstanding that (i) the officer did not attach or affix his official seal thereto .... "120 Although Virginia's
Notary Act provides that a notary "shall" affix an official seal on
every notarial certificate, it has also provided that "failure to affix
an official seal shall not in any way impact the legality or efficacy
116. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-405 (Supp. 2008).
117. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 830, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-401 (Supp. 2008)).
118. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
119. Act of Mar. 22, 1977, ch. 333, 1977 Va. Acts 471 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN.§ 64.1-87.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
120. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-87.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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of the paper document."121 However, this latter provision was repealed by the 2008 Session,122 which also added a section to the
conveyancing chapter, providing in part that "[a] writing that is
not properly notarized ... shall not invalidate the underlying
document."123 Summing up these developments, it is clear that
the absence of a seal on a self-proving affidavit will have no negative impact upon the will itself; at most it will simply require that
the will be probated in the traditional manner, which typically
will be upon the testimony of one of the attesting witnesses.
Whether the 2008 repeal of the general provision in section
47.1-16(C) of the Notary Act, that "failure to affix an official seal
shall not in any way impact the legality or efficacy of the paper
document,"124 also impliedly repeals the specific provision contained in section 64.1-87.1 that a self-proving affidavit will beeffective "notwithstanding that (i) the officer did not attach or affix
his official seal thereto,"125 seems doubtful. Nevertheless, until
this issue is resolved the prudent attorney will ensure that every
self-proving affidavit is under seal in order to meet the requirements of the Notary Act.126
It should also be noted that the 1983 Session provided for an
alternate form of self-proving affidavit, usually referred to as the
"short form" affidavit, which differs from the long-form affidavit
by not requiring the signatures of the testator and witnesses thereto.127 The short-form affidavit has never had any provision for a
"seal," nor has it contained any language like that found in the
long-form section providing that a seal is not necessary. Accordingly, it seems clear that the short-form affidavit will be gov-

121. Id.§ 47.l-16(A)-(C) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
122. Act of Mar. 2, 2008, ch. 117, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN.§ 47.l-16(C) (Cum. Supp. 2008)). However, the legislation making this change also
contained a savings clause providing "[t]hat any document notarized prior to July 1, 2008,
shall not be affected or invalidated by amendments to this Act effective July 1, 2008." H.B.
218, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 2, 2008, ch. 117, 2008
Va. Acts __J.
123. Act of Mar. 2, 2008, ch. 117, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-106.2 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
124. VA. CODE ANN.§ 47.1-16(C) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
125. Id.§ 64.1-87.1 (Rep!. Vol. 2007).
126. It is believed that most attorneys are already following this practice in order to
give their documents as much effect as possible beyond Virginia's boundaries because the
"seal" is required on self-proving affidavits in many states. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2504(a), 8 U.L.A. 148 (1998).
127. Act of Mar. 14, 1983, ch. 83, 1983 Va. Acts 94 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-87.2 (Rep!. Vol. 2007)).
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erned by the provisions of the Notary Act, discussed above, and
thus it will not be effective without the required seal.128

C. Insolvent Estates-Priority of Debts
Virginia Code section 64.1-157 establishes the priorities in
which claims against an insolvent decedent's estate are to be
paid. The 2008 Session increased the priority amount for funeral
expenses from $2000 to $3500.129
IV. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

A. Principal and Agent-Joint Accounts-Presumption of Fraud
The primary issue in Grubb u. Grubb involved Brother, who
was agent under Sister's durable general power of attorney,
claiming ownership of certain joint bank accounts upon Sister's
death.130 In disputed testimony, Brother claimed that Sister had
added his name to these accounts before he became her agent and
that "he merely renewed the accounts in order to maintain the
'status quo."'131 The Supreme Court of Virginia noted prior authority for the proposition that "any transaction involving her assets that he consummated to his own benefit while acting as her
fiduciary is presumptively fraudulent,"132 and added that the
presumption arose in this case when Brother "either opened or
renewed those accounts using his power of attorney."133 After reviewing the conflicting evidence in this case, the court affirmed
the chancellor's decision that Brother had not rebutted the presumption.134

128. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the short-form does not enjoy a wide following
among Virginia lawyers, because it is not believed to have as much currency outside the
commonwealth as the Jong-form.
129. Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 817, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN.§ 64.1-157(3) (Supp. 2008)).
130. 272 Va. 45, 49-50, 630 S.E.2d 746, 749 (2006).
131. Id. at 53, 630 S.E.2d at 751.
132. Id. (citing Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 259 Va. 806, 812, 528 S.E.2d 714, 718
(2000); Nicholson v. Shockey, 192 Va. 270, 277-78, 64 S.E.2d 813, 817-18 (1951)).
133. Grubb, 272 Va. at 54, 630 S.E.2d at 752.
134. Id. at 58, 630 S.E.2d at 754.
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B. Wrongful Death Action-Administrator May Not Proceed Pro

Se
In Kone v. Wilson, the Supreme Court of Virginia "consider[ed]
whether the administrator of a decedent's estate may file a
wrongful death action pro se."135 Answering this question in the
negative, the court noted that, although this statutory "right of
action" is vested in a personal representative by Virginia Code
section 8.0l-50(B), "[t]he cause of action, however, does not belong
to the personal representative but to the decedent's beneficiaries
identified in Code§ 8.01-53."136
C. Wills-Personal Property-Personal Injury Cause of ActionD. C. Law

In Huaman v. Aquino, Sister bequeathed unto three of her six
brothers "all the personal property I own or over which I have
disposing power at the time of my death, including funds in any
and all financial accounts."137 At the time of Sister's death she
had a personal injury action pending in Washington, D.C., which
was settled after her death-which occurred as a result of these
injuries-with payment to her estate of $1, 778,578.138 Sister's executor maintained that these funds did not pass under the above
bequest because Sister "neither owned nor had power to dispose
of such property, namely the proceeds, at the time of her
death."139 Although such a personal injury action would not survive Sister's death under Virginia law, where a new cause of action for wrongful death would arise in favor of certain statutory
beneficiaries instead of Sister's estate, the Supreme Court of Virginia found the contrary to be true under District of Columbia
law.140 Thus, "[t]his particular chose in action was 'owned' at the
moment of [Sister's] death ... and pass[ed] under the personal
property clause."141

135. 272 Va. 59, 61, 630 S.E.2d 744, 745 (2006).
136. Id. at 62-63, 630 S.E.2d at 746.
137. 272 Va. 170, 174, 630 S.E.2d 293, 296 (2006).
138. Id. at 172, 630 S.E.2d at 295.
139. Id. at 175, 630 S.E.2d at 296.
140. Id. at 175-76, 630 S.E.2d at 297.
141. Id. at 176, 680 S.E.2d at 297.
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D. Augmented Estate-Election-No Acknowledgment-Strict
Construction
In order for a surviving spouse to claim an elective share in a
deceased spouse's augmented estate, Virginia Code section 64.113 requires that the claim "shall be made either in person before
the court ... or by writing recorded in such court, or the clerk's
office thereof, upon such acknowledgment or proof as would authorize a writing to be admitted to record under Chapter 6 (§
55-106 et seq.) of Title 55."142 In Haley v. Haley, Wife's attorney
purported to make an election on her behalf by filing a document
in the appropriate clerk's office that was signed on her behalf by
the attorney but not acknowledged.143 Affirming the decision below, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that one seeking to elect
under section 64.1-13 "must strictly comply with [its] requirements" and thus, as the document in question was not acknowledged, it was ineffective as a matter of law.144 For this same reason, the court did not reach one part of an issue that has long
been debated among Virginia lawyers-whether an augmented
estate election can be made on a surviving spouse's behalf by the
spouse's attorney.145
E. Deeds-Rescission-Undue Influence-Family Relationship

The facts in Bailey v. Turnbow showed that, following her husband's death in 1989, Annerbell's closest kindred were twelve
nieces and nephews, one of whom, Mary, "handled her financial
affairs from 1993 until [Annerbell's] death" in 1997, and another
of whom, Gilbert, with whom she "also had a close relationship"
and who, along with Mary, "resided near her and helped her in
various ways during her widowhood."146 Within the last two
months of her life, Annerbell, who had just recently signed herself
out of the nursing home she had voluntarily entered two months
earlier, and who was generally in a physically weakened condition, conveyed her home to Gilbert by deed of gift with the reser142. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-13 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
143. 272 Va. 703, 705, 636 S.E.2d 400, 401 (2006).
144. Id. at 707, 636 S.E.2d at 402.
145. Id. at 708 n.*, 636 S.E.2d at 403 n.* ("[W]e ... express no opinion in that regard."
The other half of the issue is whether an augmented estate election can be made on a surviving spouse's behalf by the spouse's attorney in fact.
146. 273 Va. 262, 264, 639 S.E.2d 291, 291-92 (2007).
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vation of a life estate.147 The deed of gift was prepared by Gilbert's attorney, at Gilbert's request, and executed by Annerbell in
Gilbert's home before a notary public who worked there as an
employee of Gilbert and his wife.148
Annerbell's executor brought suit against Gilbert seeking rescission of the deed of gift based upon a number of grounds, only
one of which, undue influence, was not dismissed following a fiveday trial.149 On this point, the chancellor ruled that the evidence
had established a confidential relationship between Annerbell
and Gilbert, "giving rise to a presumption of undue influence,
which [Gilbert] had failed to rebut, in the procurement of the
challenged deed."150 Noting the absence of either a principal/agent or an attorney/client relationship between Annerbell and
Gilbert, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the only
remaining possibility of raising a presumption of undue influence
was "'when one family member provides financial advice or handles the finances of another family member."'151 However, the
evidence showed that Mary was the one who provided this advice
and rendered these services and thus the court held that,
"[t]ested by that standard, the evidence in the present case is insufficient to support the chancellor's finding."152

F. Decedent's Personal Injury Action-Not Wrongful DeathStatute of Limitations
In Harmon v. Sadjadi, "a personal injury action for damages
allegedly sustained by James [in Virginia] prior to his death from
other causes," the Supreme Court of Virginia held that, notwithstanding Harmon's earlier qualification as James' personal representative in another state, the one-year statute of limitations for
Harmon to bring this action in Virginia did not begin until he
qualified in Virginia.153 This decision overruled the court's prior
holding in McDaniel v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 154 which was
147. Id. at 265--66, 639 S.E.2d at 292.
148. Id. at 266, 639 S.E.2d at 292.
149. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 293.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 268 & n.*, 639 S.E.2d at 294 & n.* (2007) (quoting Friendly Ice Cream Corp.
v. Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 34, 597 S.E.2d 34, 40 (2004)).
152. Bailey, 273 Va. at 268, 639 S.E.2d at 294.
153. 273 Va. 184, 188 n.2,198, 639 S.E.2d 294, 296 n.2, 302 (2007).
154. 198 Va. 612, 95 S.E.2d 201 (1956).
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"clearly a mistake and a flagrant error that we will not perpetuate."155

G. Illegitimacy-Action To Ascertain Parental Relationship-No
Tolling
One of the steps required by statute before an illegitimate person's claim to intestate succession based upon biological parentage can be recognized is that "an action seeking adjudication of
parenthood is filed in an appropriate circuit court within [one
year of the alleged parent's death]."156 In Belton v. Crudup, the
decedent died on September 13, 1999; his administrator filed a
list of heirs with the court on December 21, 1999 naming the
claimant, the decedent's alleged illegitimate daughter, as an heir;
and his administrator filed an amended list of heirs on July 17,
2001 on which the claimant's name no longer appeared.157 The
claimant, whose action seeking adjudication of parenthood was
not filed until January 16, 2002, maintained that the one-year
statute of limitations should be tolled "during the time her name
appeared on the original list of heirs filed by the Administratrix."158 In affirming the trial court's denial, the Supreme Court
of Virginia noted that the General Assembly had provided only
three exceptions to the one-year rule,159 none of which were applicable in this case, and "we decline to carve out others."160

H. Illegitimacy-Exhumation To Prove Biological RelationshipNo Defenses

In Martin v. Howard, Decedent was survived by Wife, by their
two children, and by Tracey, who maintained that she was his il-

Harmon, 273 Va. at 197, 639 S.E.2d at 301.
VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(4) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
273 Va. 368, 370, 641 S.E.2d 74, 75 (2007).
Id. at 370, 372, 641 S.E.2d at 75, 76 (2007).
These exceptions apply when the relationship is
(i) established by a birth record prepared upon information given by or at the
request of such parent; or (ii) by admission by such parent of parenthood before any court or in writing under oath; or (iii) by a previously concluded proceeding to determine parentage pursuant to the provisions of former
§ 20-61.1 or Chapter 3.1 (§ 20-49.1 et seq.) of Title 20.
VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(4) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
160. Belton, 273 Va. at 373, 641 S.E.2d 76-77.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
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legitimate daughter.161 When Tracey sought the exhumation of
Decedent's body for biological testing in furtherance of her claim,
she was opposed by Wife who maintained that the exhumation
statute should be read as requiring a showing of "good cause,"162
which would require Tracey to show "'that DNA sufficient for a
definitive paternity test could be retrieved in the specific circumstances here, e.g., embalming and the lapse of time since burial."'163 In rejecting this claim, and affirming the trial court, the
Supreme Court of Virginia traced the history of the exhumation
legislation and noted that in the present statute "the General Assembly expressly provided that the need of a qualified illegitimate
child to prove parentage for the purpose of inheritance is sufficient cause for exhumation. No other cause need be shown."164

I.

Power of Attorney-Gift vs. Contract-Payable on Death
Authority

In Jones v. Brandt, Principal (''P') told Agent ("A") on August 4,
2004 to make a friend ("F') the payable on death ("POD") beneficiary on a certain $250,000 certificate of deposit.165 A, who was
also P's lawyer, did so that same day and advised P thereof by letter on the following day.166 The written power of attorney held by
A did not expressly grant A the power to make a POD designation.167 Following P's death on September 30, 2004, F, as P's executor, brought suit to determine the validity of this transaction.168 The Supreme Court of Virginia first decided that Virginia
law relating to an agent's power "to make a gift" was not applicable because the POD designation "did not become a final disposition of [P's] certificate until his death on September 30, 2004 and
conveyed no present interest in the certificate, but only at best an
expectancy."169 Instead, the court decided that the case concerned
161. 273 Va. 722, 724, 643 S.E.2d 229, 230 (2007).
162. Id. at 726, 643 S.E.2d at 231.
163. Id.
164. Id. On another point, the court held that "the word 'may' [in the exhumation statute] is jurisdictional and directional, rather than discretionary .... The court's only discretion is limited to determining whether the petitioner is a 'party attempting to prove'
parentage for inheritance purposes in accordance with Code §§ 64.1-5.l and -5.2." Id. at
727, 643 S.E.2d at 232.
165. 274 Va. 131, 135, 645 S.E.2d 312, 314 (2007).
166. Id. at 134, 135, 645 S.E.2d at 313, 314.
167. Id. at 134, 645 S.E.2d at 313.
168. Id. at 134, 135, 645 S.E.2d at 313, 314.
169. Id. at 137, 645 S.E.2d at 315.
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A's "power to contract on behalf of [.P]"l 70 and, although "[i]n Virginia, powers of attorney have been strictly construed for over a
century,"171 the court, after considering three contract-related paragraphs of the power of attorney "in concert," concluded in a
four-to-three decision that P "sufficiently expressed the intent to
authorize [A]" to make the change in question.172
The majority opinion's determination that the POD designation
in F's favor was not a gift because it was not a "final disposition"
during P's lifetime "and conveyed no present interest in the certificate, but only at best an expectancy"l 73 appears to be based upon
the fact that P had the power to revoke this designation until the
moment of his death.174 However, looking at another body of law
where this issue has long been settled, when Grantor creates a
revocable inter vivos trust reserving a life estate and giving the
remainder thereafter to Beneficiary, there is no doubt that Beneficiary receives a present interest upon the trust's creation, notwithstanding that it is not a "final disposition" until Grantor's
death.175 And, drawing closer to a POD transaction, one of the
required elements of the somewhat similar gift causa mortis is its
revocability by the donor up to the moment of death.176 Thus, it is
submitted that whether the POD designation in this case was a
"gift" should have been determined by the presence of donative
intent on P's part and the absence of any consideration flowing
from F-not by the fact that the designation was revocable until
P's death. A further troubling aspect of this decision relates to the
precedent it establishes for the interpretation of other powers of
attorney circulating in Virginia. It is believed that the typical

170. Id. at 138, 645 S.E.2d at 315.
171. Id. at 137, 645 S.E.2d at 315.
172. Id. at 138, 645 S.E.2d at 315-16. In a footnote to its conclusion, the Supreme
Court also noted:
Although not addressed by the circuit court or raised by the parties in this
appeal, we note that the doctrine of ratification would apply on the facts of
this case even if the language of the power of attorney was not sufficiently
specific to have permitted [A] to make the change in beneficiary on the certificate. The record plainly shows that [P] orally directed [A] to act as his agent
in the matter, and that [P], when advised by [A] that he had carried out that
direction, accepted the fact of performance without objection.
Id. at 139 n.2, 645 S.E.2d at 316 n.2 (citing Higginbotham v. May, 90 Va. 233, 238-39, 17
S.E. 941, 943 (1893)).
173. Jones, 274 Va. at 137, 645 S.E.2d at 315.
174. See id. at 142, 645 S.E.2d at 318 (Russell, J., dissenting).
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. b (2003).
176. For a listing of the required elements for a gift causa mortis, see Woo u. Smart,
247 Va. 365, 368-69, 442 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1994).
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consumer would think that placing another's name on a bank account as a POD beneficiary would be a method for making a gift,
and that the typical consumer executing a durable power of attorney does not wish the agent to be able to make gifts. However,
the typical durable general power of attorney confers broad and
comprehensive contracting powers upon the agent and it concludes with an all-inclusive "do whatever I could do" authorization. Do the agents under such documents have the power177 to
make POD designations? And, what are the implications for
transfer on death ("TOD") security registrations? Although these
are issues that lawyers can address as they draft documents for
future clients, what about existing documents-particularly those
of incapacitated persons who are unable to change their powers?
Absent legislation, it is difficult to see how this problem might be
resolved.
On another point, the majority opinion's statement of facts recites that "[P] orally directed [A] to designate [.F] as the beneficiary 'payable on death' (POD) of a certificate of deposit in the
amount of $250,000, which was in [P's] name at the Pungo branch
of Wachovia Bank."178 One wonders why this oral direction was
not seen as a sufficient grant of authority for the transaction in
question. According to section 3.01 of the Restatement (Third) of
Agency, "[a]ctual authority, as defined in § 2.01179 is created by a
principal's manifestation to an agent that, as reasonably understood by the agent, expresses the principal's assent that the agent
take action on the principal's behalf."180 In amplification of this
rule, the comments to the following section, section 3.02, state
that in the absence of a statutory "equal-dignity" rule,181
"[c]reating actual authority under § 3.01 does not require a writing or other formality."182

177. The only question being posed here is whether an agent possesses such a power.
The rightful exercise of the power is another issue.
178. Jones, 274 Va. at 135, 645 S.E.2d at 314.
179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006), states that "[a]n agent acts with
actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the
principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestations
to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act."
180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 3.01 (2006).
181. VA. CODE ANN.§ 11-9.5 (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Cum. Supp. 2008), entitled "Gifts under
power of attorney," deals with the contents of a "power of attorney or other writing," but it
does not impose a writing requirement upon a principal's direction to an agent to make a
particular transfer.
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 3.02, cmt. b (2006).
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J. Augmented Estate-Abandonment Defined-Voluntary
Separation
In Purce v. Patterson, Husband ("H') and Wife ("W') voluntarily separated in June 2000; W filed an action for divorce in January 2003, based upon living separate and apart for over a year,
but no divorce decree was ever entered; and H, following W's
death in January 2005, claimed an elective share in W's augmented estate.183 One of the statutes governing the augmented
estate bars the survivor's right to an elective share if the survivor
"willfully deserts or abandons his or her spouse and such desertion or abandonment continues until the death of the spouse."184
In passing upon H's claim, the Supreme Court of Virginia (1) determined that "[i]n an elective share analysis, an agreed separation or petition for divorce ... is not evidence which defeats a
finding of willful abandonment;"l85 (2) concluded that H's conduct
following the couple's agreed-upon separation was relevant in determining whether there was an abandonment that continued until W's death;l86 (3) defined "abandonment" for elective share
matters "to mean a termination of the normal indicia of a marital
relationship combined with an intent to abandon the marital relationship;"l87 and (4) held "that the evidence [was] sufficient to
support the trial court's holding that [H] abandoned [Wj prior to
and continuing until the time of her death."188
Although Virginia lawyers may be pleased upon first hearing
that they have been provided with a definition of "abandonment"
for elective share purposes in cases where there has been a voluntary separation and one of the parties has filed for divorce, this
pleasure is likely to be short-lived because it would appear that
outcomes thereunder may very well vary "with the length of the
chancellor's foot." Until the General Assembly or another Supreme Court of Virginia decision further defines "the normal indicia of a marital relationship" and "intent to abandon the marital
relationship" in cases where the parties thereto have voluntarily
separated, it will not be possible for lawyers to advise affected
clients regarding the appropriate course of action to take, due to

183. 275 Va. 190, 192-93, 654 S.E.2d 885, 886 (2008).
184. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-16.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
185. Purce, 275 Va. at 195, 654 S.E.2d at 887.
186. Id. at 194, 654 S.E.2d at 887.
187. Id. at 195, 654 S.E.2d at 887.
188. Id. at 196, 654 S.E.2d at 888.
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the varying interpretations that may be reached by circuit court
judges. Fortunately, the problem will exist only in cases where
the separated parties have not entered into an agreement that,
among other things, addresses the elective share issue, and one
would expect there to be such an agreement in the typical case.
K. Wills-Execution-Witnesses' Signatures Only on Self-Proving

Affidavit
The issue before the Supreme Court of Virginia in Hampton
Roads Seventh-Day Adventist Church v. Stevens was "whether a
will was subscribed by two witnesses as required by Code §
64.1-49."189 The writing in question consisted of five pages, numbered one through five.190 The first three pages contained will
provisions, with page three containing a testimonium clause (referring to "my Last Will and Testament, consisting of five pages");
Testatrix's signature; and spaces for witnesses to sign.191 However, instead of the witnesses signing in these spaces, the notary
printed their names therein, wrote their addresses next to their
names, and then the witnesses placed their initials by their addresses.192 Page four of the writing contained a standard selfproving affidavit, based upon the form found in Virginia Code
section 64.1-87.1, with the signatures of Testatrix and the three
witnesses appended thereto.193 Page five contained the certification of the notary public to the self-proving affidavit.194 The court
briefly noted "the rationale for the subscription requirement,"195
noted "'[t]he literal meaning of the word subscribe, as used in the
statute,"'196 and stated that, although the statutory requirements

189. 275 Va. 205, 207, 657 S.E.2d 80, 81 (2008). The referenced code section is reproduced supra note 2.
190. Stevens, 275 Va. at 207, 657 S.E.2d at 81.
191. Id. at 207-08, 657 S.E.2d at 81.
192. Id. at 208, 657 S.E.2d at 81.
193. Id. at 208-09, 657 S.E.2d at 81-82; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-87.1 (Repl. Vol.
2007).
194. See Stevens, 275 Va. at 211, 657 S.E.2d at 83.
195. Id. at 210-11, 657 S.E.2d at 83. The court quoted Robinson v. Ward, 239 Va. 36,
41-42, 387 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1990), a case notable as one of the few instances where the
Supreme Court of Virginia (in a four-to-three decision) applied "substantial compliance"
instead of "strict adherence" to one of the statutory formalities. For a detailed discussion of
Robinson, see J. Rodney Johnson, Dispensing with Wills Act Formalities for Substantively
Valid Wills, 18 VA. B. Ass'N J. 10 (1992).
196. Stevens, 275 Va. at 211, 657 S.E.2d at 83 (quoting French v. Beville, 191 Va. 842,
850, 62 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1951)). This literal meaning is "'to write underneath; sub, under;
scribere, to write."' Id. (quoting French, 191 Va. at 850, 62 S.E.2d 886).
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"must be strictly followed, the statute must not be construed in a
manner that would 'increase the difficulty of the transaction to
such an extent as to practically destroy' an uninformed layperson's right to dispose of property by will."197 Moving on to the
facts, the court noted that Testatrix referred to her will as consisting of five pages; she signed below this reference on page
three; and she signed the self-proving affidavit on page four,
"which, in this instance, is a part of her will .... [and two witnesses] placed their signatures below the testatrix' signature on
that page .... [which] satisfies the statutory requirement of subscription contained in Code § 64.1-49."198
There is no doubt that the correct result was reached in this
case, but one wonders why the court did not simply hold that witnesses' signing a self-proving affidavit to a will amounts to "substantial compliance" with the requirement for witnesses to sign
the will to which it is appended,199 instead of holding that the
self-proving affidavit was a part of the will200-which it really
was not,201 a fact that is not changed by the testatrix's reference
to her three-page will as consisting of five pages.202 Imagine, for
instance, a future case otherwise identical to the present one, except for the page numbering and "five-page" reference: how would
it be resolved, based upon this precedent?203 On a more basic
197. Stevens, 275 Va. at 211, 657 S.E.2d at 83 (quoting Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540,
546, 49 S.E. 668, 669-70 (1905)). However, the opinion in Savage was not focusing on the
construction of the statute but on its judicial supplementation. The complete sentence from
Savage reads as follows:
It is, however, quite as important that these statutory requirements should
not be supplemented by the courts with others that might tend to increase
the difficulty of the transaction to such an extent as to practically destroy the
right of the uninformed layman to dispose of his property by will.
Savage, 103 Va. at 546, 49 S.E. at 669-70.
198. Stevens, 275 Va. at 211, 657 S.E.2d at 83.
199. See the leading case of In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991).
200. Stevens, 275 Va. at 211, 657 S.E.2d at 83 ("[T]he record is clear that the will con·
sisted of five pages, including the self-proving affidavit on pages four and five.").
201. The General Assembly recognized that these are separate documents in its 2007
enactment of the statute permitting the trial court to dispense with a testator's signature
to a will when "a person signs the self-proving certificate to a will instead of signing the
will itself." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007); discussion supra, Part II.A.; see
also Ranney, 589 A.2d at 1341-44; 1973 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 473.
202. One is reminded of the exercise where a goat is placed in a corner, with a sign
around its neck saying, "I am a pig," and then the question being posed, "What's in the
corner, a goat or a pig?"
203. Fortunately, due to the enactment of a dispensation statute by the 2007 Session,
the hypothetical will should be probated with no real problem, notwithstanding these differences, because the trial court could dispense with the statutory requirement for the
witnesses' signatures to be on the will. See supra Part II.A. However, it will require an
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point, one also wonders why there was no discussion of the witnesses' initials on page three of the will-which appeared in the
margin opposite their printed names and addresses, below the
testatrix's signature-as satisfying the statute's subscription requirement.204 It is settled Virginia law that initials will suffice as
a signature to a will,205 and that a person does not have to intend
to be signing a will as a witness in order for the person's name
placed thereon by the person to satisfy the witnessing requirement.206 Moreover, in the present case, the witnesses swore under oath in the self-proving affidavit that they "did subscribe
their names thereto [i.e., to the will] as attesting witnesses."207
V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons recited herein, it is respectfully submitted that
the 2009 Session should (1) repeal the 2008 amendment expanding the slayer statute's definition of "slayer" to include voluntary
manslaughter;208 (2) clarify or replace the Supreme Court of Virginia's definition of "abandonment" in augmented estate cases
where the parties have voluntarily separated;209 and (3) consider
a legislative response to the question of whether contract language in a power of attorney authorizes the agent thereunder to
make a POD designation on the principal's bank account.210

inter partes circuit court proceeding to obtain this remedy, whereas a holding in the instant case that witnesses signing a self-proving affidavit was substantial compliance with
the requirement for them to subscribe the will would allow the hypothetical will to be probated in the clerk's office, which would be much faster and less costly than an inter partes
proceeding in circuit court.
204. It might also be noted that the initials of the witnesses and the testatrix were
placed in the margin of all five pages of the writing before the court. Transcript of Record
at_, Hampton Roads Seventh-Day Adventist Church v. Stevens, 275 Va. 205, 657 S.E.2d
80 (No. 070401) (2008).
205. See Pilcher v. Pilcher, 117 Va. 356, 366, 84 S.E. 667, 670 (1915). The entire holographic will of Edwin M. Pilcher read as follows: "'I give to my wife, Alice McCabe Pilcher,
all of my property, real and personal. E.M.P."' Id. at 358, 84 S.E. at 668.
206. See Robinson v. Ward, 239 Va. 36, 44, 387 S.E.2d 735, 739 (1990).
207. Stevens, 275 Va. at 208, 657 S.E.2d at 81-82.
208. See supra Part III.A.
209. See supra Part IV.J.
210. See supra Part IV.I.

